Introduction
The centrality and attraction of the locale; the community, the village, the ethnic and sub-ethnic units in the construction of the colonial state apparatus was celebrated with the adoption of the dual mandate: (a) non-interference with native institutions and culture; (b) the preparation of the colonial peoples for self-rule. This was a response for the challenge of constructing a multi-centric national state that could accommodate divergence and stimulate a development profile driven by local peculiarities and challenges. This context and thrust were re-enacted in the post-colonial society at the Cambridge Conference on Local Government in Africa (1961) '… it was observed that most African countries are heterogeneous and thereby contained within them potentially disruptive minorities which if not handled with care will constitute a threat to national unity. Consequently, this threat to national unity can be greatly reduced or entirely removed by the institution of Local Government … It was assumed that when Local Government are properly organized, they can serve as the best vehicles for taking into account, the interest of minorities and bringing them into a general or broader framework of national unity (quoted in Aghayere, 1995:275) .
Cast in this mood, the Nigerian state, colonial and post-colonial, imbibed one fundamental conception of local government as the building block of national unity and development. It is in this context that the notion of grassroots development strategy is situated. This conception of development from below is organized around the institution of the government (Aghayere 1995 , Ademolekun 1983 , Oduola 1981 . Three objectives of the Nigerian local government are (a) Participation (b) Resource mobilization, and (c) Provision of essential services. It is in line with government's firm persuasion in the centrality of local government that a third tier status was granted to the local government level as in Brazil (Erero 1998) . Certain checks and balances which do not allow the state to exercise absolute control over the local government council in its operation as a third tier government include its guaranteed existence as in Section 7 of the 1999 constitution; financial allocation from the federation account; and the involvement of the local government council in economic planning of the state government (Imhanlihimi and Ikeanyibe 2009:77) . There are various phases of the local government system in Nigeria. These are (1) the colonial phase, (2) the local government reforms of the 1950s, (3) the military coup of 1991 and the 1976 local government reforms. With the antilocal authority system mobilization against the colonial state by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in the West and Dr. Zik in the East, a reform process that created a three tier local government system via: (a) county or division (b) district and (c) local council was institutionalized in 1950. During the post-coup and post-war years, this new structure was differently understood and applied by the military governors either as "Native Authority, local government authority" development area", development administration, etc. in various states without the needed uniformity. The confusion triggered the need for unification of the Nigerian local government system which was implemented by the Murtala Muhammed Administration in 1976. With the 1976 reform, the country adopted a single-tier system of local government which must be operationalised all over the federation. The focus of this reform was uniformity of:
(a) The functions of the local government; (b) The structure of local government; (c) The financial resources of local government; (d) The place of traditional rulers in local government; (e) The relationship with the state government; and (f) Law enforcement.
This uniformity was further promoted by the Civil service reform of 1988 which enabled Babangida to radically transform and professionalise the service and the local government system.
In doing this, the presidential system which had been applied at the federal and state levels was introduced at the local level for clearer separation of power and checks and balances at grassroots. In this system, the chairman is not a member of the council but the executive head, with the entire L.G.A as his constituency. In the same vein, the executive supervisor without legislative responsibility was now introduced at the grassroot as it applied at the state and federal levels. With these reforms, the Nigerian local government system has come a long way. Issues that are now emerging are (1) how has the spate of reform patronage translated into grass roots governance as an arena of development process. What does the reform mean for the government at the state and federal levels in terms of grassroots instrumentality of governance and development? What has happened to grassroots resource Profile in the context of institutional leverage? Can the grassroots drive rural development? In addressing these issues, the paper is discussed in five sections. Section one address introductory and background issues while rural resource retention capacity as our framework of analysis is articulated in section II. Section III presents the resource profile of Edo state local government councils while section IV presents resource utilization as development cost. The theme, Edo drama of development is articulated in the concluding section.
The framework: local resource retention capacity. The primary goal of creating a third tier is to switch development backward through the construction of new local poles of development. The mission is propelled by the need to de-concentrate development resources around the center and around the urban locales with a view to arresting the rising trend of rural-urban disarticulation and incoherence, characteristic of the Nigerian Spatial development profile. This traditional character has been marked by reverse resource transmission, rural resource depletion, rising rural poverty, rural infrastructural under development, urban over population, urban unemployment, rising urban social segmentation, and the attendant social maladjustment manifested in increased crime wave, declining moral value and social decay.
The creation of new local government is not necessarily synonymous with the creation of new resource domain or new poles of development in culturally multi-centric society, based on diverse and competing centers of external loyalty. The capacity to retain local resources or local surplus value depends on local availability of critical infrastructure. The creation of local resource domain depends on the local government's capacity to locally retain surplus value. The evolution of a local development pole within the LGA is dependent on the LGAs local resource retention capacity. In the absence of a local development pole, reverse resource transfer to alternative centers of development outside the local government take root. In the process, the L.G.A suffers from the crisis of runaway development. Local resource retention capacity therefore is the measure of the absorptive capacity of the L.G.A. to locally retain the values appropriated by the newly created L.G.A. Such appropriated values find their way back to their origins; state or federal in the context of low local absorptive capacity. Enhanced local absorptive capacity is therefore a necessary condition for the evolution of local poles of development. Figure 1 below captures the possible relationship between rural (LGA) local development poles and urban (external) competing development pole.
As presented in Figure 1 , LRRC captures the capacity of a local government to retain resources locally (i.e. within) the local government, around development poles A, B, C, LPD as in A & C are local poles of development while ECDP is an external competing development pole, attracting resources from LDP in a relationship of urban extractive ratio that exploits the rural LGAs through resource centralization around urban development pole. RRT is the process of rural resource transfer from underdeveloped rural enclave to a developed urban enclave, i.e. ECDP, while the three poles are development poles drawing resources from the centre. A & C transfer their weak resources to B. In this process, B strengthens as a resource domain while A & C degenerates into a partial resource domain. The concepts of vertical departmentalism, resource domain, rural retention capacity and reverse resource transfer have been articulated in Ebohon (1995:320-322) Situation analysis: The human and financial resources available to councils have been in steady increase since 1999. This trend has not been felt in terms of the development dreams that informed the demands for the creation of local government councils. The failure of councils to play such developmental role is informed by their inability to retain resources locally for development. Some observations will suffice in this respect.
(a) while average monthly statutory allocation for each council in Edo state has risen from N10m in 1999 to about N50m by 2008, the development index has suggested decay or at best stagnation; (b) The earnings of 75-85 percent of senior staff which account for more than 80 percent of wage bill is not utilized or invested in the local economy; it is rather transferred to the metropolitan Benin-City economy where they live with their children; (2008) B C A (c) This figure is as high as 10 percent from the south senatorial district who worked in Benin, where all staff of the rural local government-Uhunmwode, Orhionmwon, Ovia south west and Ovia North east domicile in Benin City, with their families. (d) The trends towards increased appropriation for recurrent and overhead expenditure, which averages 60 percent-70 percent of council's budget and which is controlled by the same cadre, further escalates the rising incidence of urban extractive ratio and reverse resource flow. (e) The fact that 100 percent of the major contractors handling capital projects are domiciled in Benin City, even when they are indigenes of the local government area, further questions the structure of opportunity utilization and the urban extractive ratio; (f) The movement of the young youths and successful rural dwellers to Benin City, who accumulate through the councils, for building of modern urban structure as a first home concept, and functional rural structure as a second home concept to the neglect of their ancestral homes and shrines, clearly mark the failure of rural
LGAs as development poles; (g) The high incidence of reverse resource flow, so engendered has spelt runaway development and runaway opportunities in the context of rural LGAs. This crisis must be situated in the context of low resource retention capacity, and the absence of a local development pole within the rural local government areas; (h) The incidence of runaway opportunities and runaway development does not only strengthen the urban development pole, it also depoles the rural enclave.
The functions of local government councils:
The 1976 local government reforms which created unified local government councils for the first time in the history of Nigerian grassroot government also identified and classified local government functions into three categories. This is in line with its new scope and responsibilities. These functions were later recaptured under schedule four of the 1979 constitution and schedule four of the 1989 constitution which was actually never operational. The 1999 constitution also outlined similar functions for the third tier under the fourth schedule (1999:LL196-097) section 7. These functions are often locally and environmentally circumscribed. They include: (a) Those functions which require detailed local knowledge for efficient performance. 
Grassroots resource profile
Grassroot resource profile in Nigeria has been undermined by the unstreamlined and uncoordinated history and structure of the Nigerian local government from the early days of the local authority to 1981. In effect, even in the face of the great reform of 1976, financial arrangement for the third tier remained either a pittance or a token or an unstable gesture from the central government. This development undermined the claim and pretensions of creating an autonomous local tier. The situation was not helped by the paucity of independent revenue available to the local council (Ebohon 1995:308) As Wraith (1972:119-120 ) observed: 'In many other countries, among them Canada and the United States, New Zealand, Sweden, West Germany and Switzerland, the average amount raised locally is about 70 percent and local government is proportionately more independent' (Also quoted in Imam, 1990) . Two observations informed by empirical evidence are germane on the issue of grassroots financing by the center. The first is that the early history of local financing has been characterized by epileptic disbursement not based on a regular sharing formula. When the third tier gained recognition through the reform of 1976, allocation was an ordinary token, not matched by policy proclamation and the dream of local transformation (see table 1).
Thus, the structure took the profile of window dressing constructed to legitimise authoritarianism at the grassroots. However, rising from a poor level of 1.48% of federation account allocation of 1976/77 to the current level of 20% implies a remarkable improvement, although capacity for rural transformation is still being tested. See Table 2 Table 4 shows a massive state default in disbursement of constitutionally recognized receipt. In addition, internal revenue performance is on speedy decline. The super story of local decay is not told without capturing the expenditure profile of overdeveloped local bureaucracies. The prospects for improved revenues remain high as table 2 has shown. Not much is however on ground to show for the improved earnings from the federation account. Expenditure pattern is generally tilted towards recurrent and overhead spending with little left for capital project. Tables 5 and 6 which must also be viewed in couplet, capture the super story of bureaucratic over development at the Edo grassroot and the wider national space. Edo drama: the political economy of rural locale de-poling. Ikelegbe (2005:54) summarized the new grassroot optimism when he declared that there is tremendous strengthening of local government funding, structuring, autonomy and democratization. A number of questions however being asked are (1) is this rising federal revenue profile reflected in the performance of councils? (2) are council funds well managed? and (3) are councils constructing local poles of development?. Can the local councils construct local development poles that can attract development to the grassroots within the existing frame work of limited local retention capacity? What is the character of the development drama that has played out in Edo state in the context of rising revenue profile? In this part of the paper, we want to observe that increased funding and the institutionalization of grassroots, command-type democracy may not limit the constraint of an antidevelopmental fragmentation unleashed by prebendalization (Joseph1991).
Thus in the context of the peculiar development of the drama that has been played out in the contemporary Edo grass root development profile, a number of observations are instructive. The arrest of 18 possible grass root poles of development following the creation of the existing LGAs is one disappointment of a failed development dream unleashed by a constructivist illusion. Edo state experience has shown consistent rural decay in the face of increased revenue. Only four poles of development; Benin City, Auchi, Ekpoma and Uromi have emerged as new development poles and resource domains.
In deploying the advantage of urban extractive ratio to tap resources from rural LGAs, rising urban poles have reduced the rural LGAs into enclaves of partial resource domains in a reverse transfer relationship that stunts the prospects for the growth of rural local development pole.
In the context of Edo-south senatorial district, reverse resource transfer relationship is actualized in several forms. All senior staff of the four local government councils-Uhumwode, Ohrionmwon, Ovia South-West and Ovia North East reside with their family members in Benin City; Oredo, Egor and Ikpoba Okha. They are part of the Benin urban metropolitan economy and development system and not of the rural local government of origin or place of work. The cultural expectation that Benin City is the ultimate home of Edo people tends to predispose them towards Benin property development platform. Local shrines and deities are abandoned while new urban statuses and identities are acquired. This change is enhanced by improved personal and family finances as every one is accepted into Benin as son of the Oba (Obhio -Oba); Similarly, more than 95 percent of the major contractors working for councils also live in Benin City with members of their families. Sources: Nigerian Government sources (1999, 2001, 2003, 2006 ) also see Imhanlahimi and Ikeayibe (2009:90) .
A similar but less centralizing process is also taking root in the other two senatorial districts. While Esan beneficiaries are likely to be pulled towards Ekpoma and Uromi central development poles, North senatorial district beneficiaries are likely to be pulled towards Auchi-North development pole. However, beneficiaries are likely in all cases to build a primary/first home in Benin City and a secondary home in beneficiaries' home-town. In this process, two layers of development poles are under construction in Edo state; central pole around Benin city; and secondary poles around Auchi, Ekpoma and Uromi. These poles are the economic and development poles competing with the partial rural local development poles envisioned in the fragmentation project of local government creation. Urban poles as resource concentration centres also attract labour force (skilled and unskilled); attract critical infrastructure; increase polar tax base and resource profile. The absence of rural poles engenders runaway jobs and opportunities and facilitates rural decay through rural-urban migration. Observation shows that the higher the revenue from the center, the higher the capacity of the urban domain to attract rural beneficiaries to urban polar opportunity.
The logic of the new construction produced a phenomena growth in the number of LGAs from about 301 in 1984 to its current size of 774 nationwide. This growth is no doubt exponential. It has been driven not by the grassroot, but by a rentier culture provoked by the oilification of the national economy. The development has given rise to prebendalization of state and politics, seeking grassroots corollary in oiling patron/client structure. In this process, the political economy elites of power, seeking integration and co-optation into a complex national system of power emerged to move for fragmentation at the grassroots (Joseph, 1985 (Joseph, & 1987 .
The central objective in the agitation for the creation of more local governments was to create grassroots access to the oil economy and the rentier system for personal transformation. Fragmentation, instead of bringing development to the grass root was a prebendal structure for primitive grassroots accumulation. Thus, while the clamour was for grassroots transformation, the motive was for local elite's access. In a vast majority of cases, it was also a system of patronage and settlement for the local political classes for services rendered during the legitimation challenges faced by the praetorian state. Such prebendal project creates political post not development pole. The post is a patronage system funded with federal allocation. This may explain while states are not sanctioned for default in remittance of state 10 percent statutory allocation to local government councils.
This may also explain why the calls for accountability sound strange at the grassroots. The form and organization of grassroots governance have predicated the collapse of rural infrastructure. It is indeed, an arena of a beastly primitive accumulation driven in contemporary times with an overdeveloped grassroots political bureaucratic machine. Ebohon (2005:209) observed:
Ley's concept of overdeveloped post-colonial state has a bearing on the patterns of development in the Edo state Local government system. Empirical evidence suggests that a vast proportion of centrally and locally derived resources is deployed for bureaucratic ends like salaries and wages, training, touring advances, media patronage and related overhead expenditure. Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the gross imbalance in the relationship between recurrent and capital spending; this is to the detriment of capital spending. The two immediate implications of this imbalance are (i) the development of rural infrastructure, tend generally to lag, leading to rural-urban migration, rural poverty and rural decay; (ii) the deployment of a vast proportion of grassroots revenue (recurrent) for bureaucratic/political projects, facilitates rural runaway resource towards the centre. The recurrent largesse in the hands of the grassroots political/administrative executives and other senior professional executives who are attracted to the urban development pole, because of their social background characteristics and upward mobility aspirations, often constitute the executive machine for draining the grassroots. In fact, recurrent budgeting has become institutionalized process for constructing grassroots rogue aristocracy with fundamental vested stake in the urban development pole. These rogue aristocrats constitute the rural corollary of the urban central rogue aristocrats and executive political directors of state, who have perfected the art of politics of the belly (Jean-Francois, 1993) . In this process, the constructed imbalance between recurrent spending and capital spending has become part of what Aluko (2002) 
dubbed the institutionalization of corruption in Nigeria
Conclusions and recommendations A number of issues that derive from the body of empirical evidence here adduced are observed in this concluding discourse. The first is that the fragmentation of grassroots centres of development into 774, has not produced 774 grassroots development poles. In Edo state, the entire project has played out 18 local political posts that reverse transfer Federal Statutory allocations to four development poles to the detriment of the rural locale. The de-poling engendered creates more decay than what existed pre-fragmentation. By the character, logic and organization of these political posts;
